This article explores the role of Iraqi women in reconstruction processes by contextualizing the current situation with respect to changing gender ideologies and relations over the past 3 decades. Before discussing the Iraqi case specifically, I provide a brief theoretical background about the significance of gender in war and conflict, in reconstruction as well as nation-building processes. A historical background aims to shed light on the changing gender ideologies and relations during
Introduction
Despite the common rhetoric of democratisation , women's rights and inclusion, Iraqi women might turn out to be the biggest losers in the current and future political and social map of Iraq. Having already suffered from the steady erosion of socioeconomic rights, which had been gained in the early years of the Saddam Hussein regime, women and gender relations have been particularly hard-hit by economic sanctions (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , as well as the recent war in 2003 and its ongoing violent aftermath. UN resolution 1325, calling for the mainstreaming of gender in all aspects of reconstruction and political state building has taken on a tragic twist: To start out with, the question of reconstruction appears immature at a time when the increasing levels of violence and conflict prevent any serious development projects and processes. Secondly, there has been the danger of a backlash against women's rights and gender relations as the call for the mainstreaming of gender is being linked to the wider issue of foreign occupation, neo-colonial configurations and an interim government that lacks widespread credibility amongst the Iraqi population.
This political dilemma should not, however, prevent political debates and academic analyses that put gender on the map. Without doubt, the differentiation and relative positioning of women and men is an important ordering principle that pervades systems of power and is sometimes its very embodiment:
Gender power is seen to shape the dynamics of every site of human interaction, from the household to the international arena. It has expression in physique -how women and men's bodies are nourished, trained and deployed, how vulnerable they are to attack, what mobility they have (Cockburn, 1999: 3) .
Gender also has expression in prevailing ideologies and norms, in laws, in citizenship rights, in political dynamics and struggles and, of course, in economics -how money, property and other resources are distributed between the sexes. However, what is important to point out here is that gender does not necessarily constitute the most significant factor. Economic class, ethnic and religious differentiation, sexual orientation and political affiliation also shape power hierarchies and structure political regimes and societies. And these differentiating factors, in turn, are gendered and are part of the specific constructs of men/masculinities and women/femininities.
In this article, I will first provide a brief theoretical background about the significance of gender in war and conflict, in reconstruction and nation-building processes before exploring the role of women and changing gender relations in contemporary Iraq. A historical background aims to shed light on the changing gender ideologies and relations during the regime of Saddam Hussein. I will focus particularly on the impacts of the early developmental-modernist discourses of the state to the impacts of war (Iran-Iraq war 1980-88 and Gulf War 1991) as well as comprehensive economic sanctions regime (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . The latter involved wider social changes affecting women and gender relations but also society at large., i.e. impoverishment of welleducated middle-class, wide-scale unemployment, an economic crises, and a shift towards more conservative values and morals.
It is against this backdrop that the impact of the latest war (2003) , the occupation and reconstruction attempts need to analysed. In addition to the most immediate effects of the current situation (lack of security and mobility, humanitarian crisis and political marginalization of women), the article will explore more long-term issues related to the issue of mainstreaming gender.
Nationalism & National Identities: Gendered Perspectives
One of the key issues in delineating gender differences is the relationship between nationalism and gender, that is the ways in which nationalism and the nation-state are gendered as well the as various ways in which women participate in or challenge nationalist processes. Case studies of women in a variety of geographical and political contexts substantiate the theoretical model sketched out by Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989: 7) to describe the various ways in which women can and do participate in ethnic and national processes: 1) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities; 2) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic and national groups; 3) as actors in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture; 4) as signifiers of ethnic and national groups; and 5) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles.
The most "natural" way in which women participate in national and ethnic processes is the "biological reproduction of the nation" which corresponds to the notion of Volksnation, a nation of common origin, common "blood and belonging" (Yuval- Davis, 1997: 66) . The relationship between cultural reproduction and gender relations can be articulated in terms of a Kulturnation. Here, gender relations are at the centre of cultural constructions of social identities and collectivities where women tend to constitute their symbolic "border guards". Being constructed as carriers of the collectivity's "honour" and the intergenerational reproducers of its culture, specific codes and regulations delineate the "proper women" and "proper men" (ibid. 67).
Often women are perceived to be both biological and cultural reproducers of a nation.
In Iraq, for example, women were asked by the regime of Saddam Hussein to "produce" future soldiers, while they were also increasingly being used as symbols for the honour and stamina of the nation. In post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, women are increasingly being used as symbols against the previous, largely secular regime as well as western cultural and political imposition. Cockburn (1999) argues convincingly that the more primordial the rendering of people and nation, the more are the relations between men and women essentialised:
'Women are reminded that by biology and by tradition they are the keepers of hearth and home, to nurture and teach children 'our ways'. Men by physique and tradition are there to protect women and children, and the nation, often represented as the 'motherland ' (p. 8) . This process can also be observed in Iraq, where the increases significance of primordial ethnic and religious identities goes side by side more conservative and restrictive gender ideologies.
Gender in War & Conflict
When violence and conflict erupt, women tend to suffer in gender-specific ways in addition to the suffering endured by all of the population. Men continue to be the major decision-makers, politicians, generals, "leaders" and soldiers involved in "making war". Yet, it is estimated that close to 90 per cent of current war casualties are civilians, the majority of who are women and children. This has to be compared to a century ago when 90 per cent of those who lost their lives were military personnel (Women Watch, Fact Sheet 5, 2005) , or in World War II when civilians were half the casualties. Increasingly, wars are fought on the home front. In Iraq, just like in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, marketplaces and bridges are bombed, as well as houses and shelters.
Sexual humiliation and mutilation, forced prostitution, rape and forced pregnancy are amongst the gender-specific violence occurring during wars. Historically, rape has certainly been the most widespread form of gender-specific violence. It can occur as a random act within the context of general lawlessness, anarchy, chaos and aggression. This seems to have been the case in Iraq in the early months after the downfall of the previous Iraqi regime. However, in some contexts rape has also been used systematically as a deliberate weapon of war and means of torture to inflict maximum harm. Rape is not only used to attack and humiliate the 'enemy woman', but through her to attack her supposedly male protectors. With women being universally used as symbols of a nation's honour and pride, raping a community' womenfolk traumatizes and violates women individually and also humiliates and attacks the whole community. Rape and sexual abuse have been rampant in the accounts of political prisoners and victims of the Saddam Hussein regime.
In the case of the wars in former Yugoslavia, women's bodies were used as 'ethnic markers' in nationalist ideology (Meznaric, 1994 , in Cockburn, 1999 ). Yet, when men are raped or sexually abused and humiliated, as it also happens during wartime, these acts are also gendered. Aside from the individual abuse, it is the enemy's masculinity and ability to protect the nation, which is under attack. These acts of aggression and humiliation are particularly devastating in societies where sexuality is perceived to be a taboo and associated with shame. However, it would be misleading to overemphasize culture or religion: it is not only Iraqi men in Abu Ghreib prison who experienced severe humiliation and a sense of emasculation, but any western men who experiences rape experiences similar trauma.
The Continuum of Violence
Instead of thinking about armed conflict and warfare as isolated instances of violence, feminist scholars and activists have alerted us to the "continuum of violence". On one level, many societies experience what has been called "structural violence" in the period prior to open conflict. According to this conceptualisation, violence exists whenever the potential development of an individual or group is held back by conditions of a relationship, and in particular by the uneven distribution of power and resources (Galtung, 1975 -80, in Cockburn, 1999 .
Many war-torn countries in the post cold era have experienced severe economic crises as a result of the disintegration of the Society Union as well as IMF imposed structural adjustment programmes. The countries of the former Yugoslavia, for example, witnessed high unemployment, depressed wages and a general economic crisis prior to the outbreak of war. During this time, women were urged to leave paid employment and pursue their "natural roles" with restrictions imposed on their reproductive freedoms (Korac, 1998) . The development in former Yugoslavia parallel state rhetoric and policies towards women and gender during the period of economic sanctions (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) in Iraq. Here the government also retreated from its previous policies of social inclusion of women and the mobilization of the female workforce once the country was faced with a severe economic crisis. Instead, Iraqi women were told to leave their work place to let men take over and to return to their "natural place" at home as mothers of future citizens and soldiers.
Feminist scholars have also argued that, in addition to "structural violence" based on the unequal distribution of resources, women experience the gendered phenomenon of violence within the context of patriarchal social relations (Kelly, 1988) . According to some analysts, all such violence should be situated within a 'sexual violence approach' (Radford et al 1996: 3) even where no overtly sexual act is involved. In this interpretation, a whole set of violent acts is subsumed under a broad definition of male sexual violence (Jacobson et al, 2000: 2) : 'Violence which takes place in the home or the workplace and on the street corner; violence involving racism, homophobia, xenophobia and other prejudices; violence on international and global levels including trafficking in women and women's experiences of war violence' (Corrin 1996: 1) .
However, I concur with the view of some authors that this approach essentialises men and masculinities as well as glosses over the multiple causes for violence, which are not merely rooted in male sexuality. This is not to deny the relationships between forms of violence within the home, on the street and within society at large and the violence occurring during conflict and war. But it is important to recognize the complex causes for violence, and acknowledge that men and women can be active agents in perpetrating and resisting violence. Lentin, for example, argues that 'Viewing women as homogeneously powerless and as implicit victims does not allow us to theorize women as benefactors of oppression, or the perpetrators' (Lentin 1997: 12) . Nor does it help us to theorize and explain women's agency with respect to peace initiatives and resistance to patriarchal gender ideologies and relations.
The links between patriarchy 1 , nationalism, and militarization of society have widely been demonstrated (Cockburn, 2002; Enloe, 1998) . Militarism is the culture, and national militaries supply the force, that tends to sustain national movements and help them to achieve their goals (Cockburn, 2002: 12) . Militarism, like any ideology, entails a whole set of core beliefs that are tied up to militarised gender regimes (Connell, 1987) -institutionally manifested gender relations. Among these core beliefs are: a) that armed force is the ultimate resolver of tensions; b) that human nature is prone to conflict; c) that having enemies is a natural condition; d) that hierarchical relations produce effective action; e) that a state without a military is naïve, scarcely modern and barely legitimate; f) that in times of crisis those who are feminine need armed protection; and g) that in times of crisis any man who refuses to engage in armed violent action is jeopardizing his own status as a manly man (Enloe, 2002: 23-24) .
Militarized gender regimes often exaggerate gender differences and inequality, and dictate complementary world s for men and women, prior, during and after wars. Men are frequently equated with the worlds of arms and glory, and women relegated to birthing and mourning (Cockburn, 2002 While militarised gender regimes generate a form of masculinity that tends to be oppressive to women and prone to violence, it is important to differentiate hegemonic masculinities from marginalized, subordinated and even subversive masculinities (Connell, 1995 (Connell, , 2002 At times of socio-political tension and economic crisis prior to conflict, as well as during conflict itself, hegemonic militaristic masculinities are celebrated and promoted more than others (Cockburn, 1999 (Cockburn, : 8, 2001 El-Bushra 2000 , in Afshar & Eade 2004 
Gender & Post-Conflict Periods
Peace for women does not mean the cessation of armed conflict. Women's security needs are not necessarily met in 'post-conflict' situations as gender-based violence still remains rampant in reconstruction periods (Gervais, 2004 ). Enloe's definition of peace is 'women's achievement of control over their lives' (Enloe 1987: 538) . Peace, as defined by Enloe, would require not just the absence of armed and gender conflict at home, locally and abroad, but also the absence of poverty and the conditions which create it (Kelly, 2000: 48) .
In reality, women often experience a backlash in post-war situations when traditional gender roles inside the home or outside are evoked. Violence against women is often endemic in post-war situations, partly due to the general state of anarchy and chaos but also as an element of heightened aggression and militarization, and prevailing constructions of masculinity promoted during conflict. An extreme example of this situation is contemporary Iraq, which despite the official ending of military conflict is extremely violent and insecure. As a matter of fact, the level of every-day experienced violence is even greater now than during the period of formal military intervention.
Women have particularly suffered from the chaos, lawlessness and lack of security and have been subject to increased harassment, abductions as well as sexual abuse and rape.
For women at home and within the diaspora, it often seems as if the challenges posed to traditional gender ideologies and roles during times of war becomes too great for patriarchal societies to accept in peace. Women often have less political space to challenge gender relations and to contribute to political processes in the aftermath of conflict. According to Pankhurst (2004) :
The ideological rhetoric is often about 'restoring' or 'returning' to something associated with the status quo before the war, even if the change actually undermines women's rights and places women in a situation that is even more disadvantageous than it was in the past. This is often accompanied by imagery of the culturally specific equivalent of the woman as 'beautiful soul', strongly associating women with cultural notions of 'tradition', motherhood, and peace (p. 19).
Historically, women rarely sustain wartime gains in peacetime. Societies neither defend the spaces women create during struggle nor acknowledge the ingenious ways in which women bear new and additional responsibilities.
Absence of Women in Formal Reconstruction Processes
In many post-conflict settings, women have been sidelined or marginalized from formal peace initiatives, political transitions and reconstruction efforts. Formal peace negotiations among warring parties and their mediators serve to define basic power relations and to identify priorities for immediate post-war political activity (Sorenson, 1998) . Traditional militarised gender regimes tend to endow men with the power in politics and locate women's importance within the family (Cockburn, 2002) .
However, women within conflict-ridden societies as well as within diasporic communities do find ways to work for peace and reconciliation through grass-roots activism. Women from all walks of life participate in this informal peace-building work, but their activities are often disparaged as 'volunteer', 'charitable' or 'social', even when they have a political impact (Ferris, in Sorenson, 1998) . Even before this last war, due to sanctions, there was a massive deterioration in basic infrastructure (water, sanitation, sewage, electricity) that severely reduced the quality of life of Iraqi families, who often have to get through the day without water and electricity. High child mortality (about 4000-5000 per month), rampant malnutrition, and increased rates of leukaemia, other forms of cancer, epidemic diseases, and birth defects were among the most obvious "side effects" of the sanctions regime.
However, everyday lives changed not only with respect to a drastic deterioration of economic conditions and basic infrastructure: the social and cultural fabric of Iraqi society has also been affected. 
Historical Context
An analysis of the impact of economic sanctions and war on women in Iraq must be prefaced by a brief historical background addressing the general situation of Iraqi women before the sanctions regime came into place in 1990. Despite indisputable political repression in the 1970s and early 1980s, the majority of the Iraqi population enjoyed high living standards in the context of an economic boom and rapid development, which were a result of the rise of oil prices and the government's developmental policies. These were the years of a flourishing economy and the emergence and expansion of a broad middle class. State-induced policies worked to eradicate illiteracy, educate women, and incorporate them into the labour force. The initial period after the nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry in 1972 was characterized by economic hardship and difficulties. But the oil embargo by OPEC countries of 1973, known as the "oil crisis," was followed by a period of boom and expansion. Oil prices shot up and oil-producing countries started to become aware of their bargaining power related to western countries' dependence on oil.
In the context of this rapid economic expansion, the Iraqi government actively sought out women to incorporate them into the labour force. In 1974, a government decree stipulated that all university graduates--men or women--would be employed automatically. In certain professions, such as those related to health care and teaching, education itself entailed a contract with the government, which obliged the students to take up a job in their respective professions.
Policies of encouraging women to enter waged work cannot be explained in terms of egalitarian or even feminist principles, however, even though several women I interviewed did comment positively on the early Baathists' policies of the social inclusion of women. The initial ideology of the Baath party, the ruling party of Iraq, was based on Arab nationalism and socialism. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore in detail the specific motivations and ideology of the Baathist regime with respect to women's roles and positions. What can be said is that human power was scarce, and that, as the Gulf countries started to look for workers outside their national boundaries, the Iraqi government also tapped into the country's own human resources.
Subsequently, working outside the home became for women not only acceptable, but prestigious and the norm. Another factor to be taken into account was the state's attempt to indoctrinate its citizens -whether male or female. A great number of party members were recruited through their work places. Obviously it was much easier to reach out to and recruit women when they were part of the so-called public sphere and visible outside the confines of their homes.
Whatever the government's motivations, Iraqi women became among the most educated and professional in the whole region. How far this access to education and the labour market resulted in an improved status for women is a more complex question. As in many other places, conservative and patriarchal values did not automatically change because women started working. Furthermore, there were great differences between rural and urban women as well as between women from different class backgrounds.
During the years of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), women's increased participation in the public sphere to replace male soldiers coincided with the further militarization of society and a glorification of certain types of masculinity, i.e. the fighter, the defender of his nation and the martyr. Women were simultaneously encouraged by the state to replace male workers and civil servants who were fighting at the front, and to "produce" more Iraqi citizens and future soldiers. The glorification of a militarized masculinity coincided with the glorification of the Iraqi mother.
Only two "peaceful" years were followed by the invasion of Kuwait (August 1990) and the Gulf War (January-March 1991). The latter was particularly traumatizing, as night after night of heavy bombing not only disrupted sleep and family lives, but left many in deep shock and fear. Iraqis invariably have vivid memories of the Gulf War, and even prior to the latest war, many Iraqis spoke about ongoing nightmares, a sense of anxiety, and a great sensitivity to certain noises that could only remotely be mistaken for bombs. Unlike other war-torn countries, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, "post-traumatic stress syndrome" has not been a recognized medical condition in Iraq. And even if it were acknowledged, lack of resources and expertise make systematic treatment impossible.
Impact of Wars and Economic Sanctions
Despite common generalized depictions of Iraqis as either culprits or victims, a closer look at Iraqi society reveals the obvious fact that Iraqi women as well as men are not a homogeneous group and have been affected by sanctions and war in different ways.
Among the numerous differentiating factors are place of residence (urban versus rural), ethnic (Arab or Kurd) and religious (Shi'a, Sunni, Christian) backgrounds, and, perhaps most important, social class. However, the previously existing class system itself has been inverted, most notably through the impoverishment of a previously broad and stable educated middle class and the rise of a class of war and sanctions profiteers. The latter group tended to be closely related to the Iraqi regime and to constitute political and economic networks of privilege. Another extremely significant factor affecting the ways sanctions and war impact on daily lives is the existence of relatives or close friends in western countries. Remittances sent by relatives from all over the world, but most notably from northern Europe and the United States, often make the difference between misery and coping.
For women of low-income classes in urban areas or poor women living in the countryside, sheer survival became the main aim of their lives. There is no doubt about the fact that it was particularly the poor mothers whose children are more likely
to become yet another statistic in the incredibly high child mortality rates or who suffer from disease and malnutrition. The deterioration of the general education system was already evident in the early 90s.Wadat, an educated middle-class woman in her late forties, had worked as a teacher in a high school until 1995. She told me:
We did not feel it so much during the first years of the sanctions, but it really hit us by 1994. Social conditions had deteriorated; the currency had been devalued while salaries were fixed. Many women started to quit work. Some of my friends could not even afford transportation to the school. Before the sanctions, the school made sure that we were picked up by a bus, but all this was cut. For me, the most important reason was my children. I did not want them to come home and be alone in the house. It has become too unsafe. And then, I know from my own work that schools have become so bad, because teachers have quit and there is no money for anything. So I felt that I have to teach them at home.
Because of the bad conditions in schools due to the lack of resources and teachers, many parents have felt that they had to contribute to their children's education.
Higher education has virtually collapsed and degrees did become worthless in the context of widespread corruption and an uninterrupted exodus of university professors in the 1990s. Monthly salaries in the public sector, which had paradoxically become increasingly staffed by women, had dropped dramatically and did not correspond to high inflation rates and the cost of living. During the period of economic sanctions, even the few academics who were still employed were often not paid their salaries. In the current post-Saddam period, salaries have risen considerable. However, unemployment rates are still very high and, due to the lack of security, women are extremely reluctant to take up work again. There have also been numerous reports of absolute chaos at universities, looting of libraries, professors being forced to step down and many have been threatened to be killed by students as they were perceived to be Baathist .
Working women like Wadat suffered from the collapse of their support systems. One previous support system, funded by the state, consisted of numerous nurseries and kindergartens, along with free public transportation to and from school and to the women's work places. The other major support system was based on extended family ties and neighbourly relations, which helped in childcare. Ever since the sanctions regime, women became reluctant to leave their children with neighbours or other relatives because of the general sense of insecurity.
Crime rates have been on the increase since the Gulf war in 1991. 
Changing Family and Gender Relations
Although Iraqi families used to be very close-knit and supportive of each other, family relationships have been strained by envy and competition in the struggle for survival. In the past, children grew up in the midst of their extended families, often spending time and sleeping over at the houses of their grandparents, uncles, and aunts.
These days, nuclear families have become much more significant in a context where people have to think about themselves and those closest to them first.
Some women reported that they had stopped visiting their relatives, as they did not want them to feel embarrassed because they could not provide them with a meal. Despite the overall strain on marital relationships, some women state that their relationships to their husbands improved. Aliya, a housewife in her late thirties, says:
My husband never did anything in the house before the sanctions. He used to work in a factory outside of Baghdad. Ever since he stopped working, he helps me to bake bread and to take care of the children. We get along much better than before because he started to realise that I am working very hard in the house.
While families and marriages are affected in multifarious ways, many Iraqi women can only dream of marriage and having their own families. One of the numerous consequences of the current demographic imbalance between men and women is the difficulty for young women to get married. Polygamy, which had become largely restricted to rural areas or uneducated people, has been on the increase in recent years.
There is also a growing trend among young women to get married to Iraqi expatriates, usually much older than they are. This is largely due to economic reasons as most Iraqi men will not be able to provide for a new family. According to some women, 
Islamization and Increased Conservatism
At the same time that marriage has become a relatively difficult undertaking, young women in particular feel pressured by a new "cultural" environment that is marked simultaneously by a decline in moral values like honesty, generosity, and sociability and an increased public religiosity and conservatism. Many women I interviewed concurred with one of my female relatives in Baghdad when they spoke sadly about the total inversion of cultural codes and moral values. I will never forget when one of my aunts told me: "You know, bridges and houses can easily be rebuilt. It will take time, but it is possible. But what they have really destroyed is our morale, or values."
She, like many other Iraqi women I talked to sadly stated that honesty was not paying off any more. People have become corrupt and greedy. Trust has become very rare word and envy even exists among closest kin.
Young Iraqi women frequently speak about changes related to socializing, family ties, and relations between neighbour and friends. Often a parent or older relative was quoted as stating how things were different from the past when socializing was a much bigger part of people's lives. Zeinab, a fifteen-year-old young woman from
Baghdad, spoke about the lack of trust between people. She suggested the following as an explanation for the change in dress code for women and the social restrictions she and her peers experience constantly:
People have changed now because of the increasing economic and various other difficulties of life in Iraq. They have become very afraid of each other. I think because so many people have lost their jobs and businesses, they are having loads of time to speak about other people's lives, and they often interfere in each other's affairs. I also think that because so many families are so poor now that they cannot afford buying more than the daily basic food, it becomes so difficult for them to buy nice clothes and nice things and therefore, it is better to wear hijab. Most people are somewhat pressured to change their lives in order to protect themselves from the gossip of other people--especially talk about family honour (Al-Ali & Hussein, 2003) .
In addition to increased responsibilities and time restrictions related to economic circumstances, especially teenage girls complain about the increasing social restrictions and difficulties of movement. While the parents of the predominantly middle-class young females who were interviewed used to mingle relatively freely when they were the age of their children, today's young Iraqis find it increasingly difficult to meet each other. Schools are often segregated between sexes, but even in co-educational schools interaction between boys and girls has become more limited. Girls are extremely worried about their reputation and often avoid situations in which they find themselves alone with a boy. These fears may have been aggravated by the not uncommon occurrence of so-called "honour killings during the past decade."
Fathers and brothers of women who are known or often only suspected of having "violated" the accepted codes of behaviour, especially with respect to keeping their virginity before marriage, may kill the women in order to restore the honour of the family. Although this phenomenon is mainly restricted to rural areas and uneducated
Iraqis, knowledge about its existence works as a deterrent for many female teenagers.
Others may be less worried about the most dramatic consequences of "losing one's reputation." For educated middle-class women from urban areas it is not so much death they fear as diminished marriage prospects.
The most obvious change that has taken place over the past decade or so is the dress code of young women. Aliya (sixteen years old) is clearly unhappy about the changes:
I do think that our life was much more easy and happy in the past than it is now. My father used to be so open and believe in women's freedom. He would let my mother go out without covering her hair when they visited our relatives in Baghdad. We only had to wear the abbayah in Najaf because it is a holy city. 2 Some years ago, he started to change his attitude to many things. And lately he has become so conservative that he thinks covering the hair is not enough, and he demanded that my mother wear abbayah everywhere outside the home. He said that I also should keep the cover on my hair when I go to Baghdad. I am now not even allowed to go out with trousers outside our home. My mother and I have to wear long skirts with a long wide shirt covering the hips when we go outside our home (ibid.).
As much as Aliya detests the imposed dress codes and her father's new conservatism, she understands the underlying reasons. She explains:
I know why my father is doing this and I am not angry with him. I discussed this issue with him many times, and I really do not blame him for this change in attitude. I think it is not only my father who is doing this, but that it may be all fathers in Iraq. They are doing the same in order to protect their daughters from the risks of becoming victims of bad rumours.
These days there have been numerous reports of unveiled women being harassed on the streets by Islamists who demand that all women wear a headscarf or abbayah.
Increased social conservatism and the threat of gossip that would tarnish one's reputation are a common complaint among young Iraqi women. Girls especially suffer in a climate where patriarchal values have been strengthened and where the state has abandoned its previous policies of social inclusion with respect to women.
2 Abbayah is the traditional black garment worn by Iraqi women. Najaf, a holy city south of Baghdad, is the location of the main Shi'a cemetery in Iraq.
Economic hardships have pushed a number of women into prostitution--a trend that is widely known and subject to much anguish in a society where a "woman's honour" is perceived to reflect the family's honour. In the mid-1990s, the government condemned prostitution has and engaged in violent campaigns to stop it. In a widely custody with a more conservative law (Article 137), and 2) the issue of a women's quota for political representation. Although women were unsuccessful to obtain a 40% quota in the transitional constitution, they managed to negotiate a 25% quota.
However, the actual long-term status of the transitional constitution and the decision of the IGC as well as CPA remain to be seen. In recent months, women's organisations have been seriously impeded by security situation which often stop women from leaving their houses altogether. This has also prevented many women from running for elections in January 2005. As the candidates were largely unknown to the Iraqi public, it has yet to be seen whether parties did actually adhere to the 25% quota.
Lack of Security
The fact that only a relatively small number of women have expressed their political dissent and wishes, is not only due to the lack of democratic political culture within Iraq. But it is also due to the fact that the biggest problems for women in Iraq today is the lack of security. Aside from the more recent threat of militant resistance and 
Conclusion
The rather bleak picture I have sketched out only touches upon some aspects of the numerous ways war, sanctions and occupation have affected women and gender relations in contemporary Iraq. In this article, I have tried to point to the social and cultural phenomena that have emerged during the past years and have to be viewed as mainly triggered by the sanctions regime and the government of Saddam Hussein. It is too early to be able to grasp fully the complex and multifarious ways the recent ongoing war and occupation is affecting daily lives as well as wider gender ideologies.
What can be said about the current situation, however, is that, so far, women have been pushed back even more into the background and into their homes. They are suffering both in terms of a worsening humanitarian situation and an ongoing lack of security on the streets. Aside from the fact that basic needs (including water, electricity, medical care, and food) as well security are not addressed adequately, a more long-term issue is the lack of women's representation in the various political parties and emerging political constituencies. It remains to be seen whether the women's quota of 25% will actually be implemented or whether a push for women's political participation during the period of occupation might eventually backfire.
What needs to be stressed is fact involving women in the reconstruction of Iraq would not simply be a matter of "adding women and stir". What is missing is a gender The mainstreaming of gender would have to involve the appointment of women to interim governments, and all ministries and committees dealing with systems of local and national governance. Women would also have to be present and active in the judiciary, policing, human rights monitoring, the allocation of funds, free media development, and all economic processes. There should be encouragement to create independent women's groups, NGOs and community based organizations.
Presenting both the majority of the population as well as an increasingly vulnerable and marginalized group, it is of ultimate importance to support women's political participation. However, due to the fact that women are perceived to be symbols and markers of cultural boundaries and 'authenticity', any insensitive promotion of women's right and women's equalities as part and parcel of 'liberation' will strongly backfire in the current context of occupation as well as in the aftermath. Not only in Iraq, but most other countries in the region and the Muslim world, western feminism is negatively identified with the imposition of western values and the eradication of indigenous culture and morals. Any women's rights initiatives and organizations promoted by the occupying forces or the Iraqi Interim Government will not only be short-lived, but will also negatively impact on locally initiated women's organizations and gender roles and ideologies more generally. Similarly, Iraqi women's organisations and activists based abroad lack legitimacy and credibility amongst the majority of the population and should not be used to either represent or short-cut locally based initiatives.
At the same time, it is important to point out that Iraq as other countries in the region and the Muslim world, has a history of indigenous women's rights struggle and women's movements. There are many mainly educated middle -class women who are already involved in humanitarian assistance as well as political lobbying & advocacy related to social justice with respect to women and gender relations. It would be detrimental for Iraqi women if they would not be given special support in the process of reconstruction and political transition.
One way to sensitively support women is to change the language from a feminist rights approach to a language stressing education, training and participation in reconstruction, thereby appealing to a modernist-developmental discourse. The other main strategy is to link women with organisations, experts and initiatives in other countries in the region or the Muslim world. Based on research I carried out amongst women's organizations in Egypt, for example, I found that women felt much more empowered by the exchange of experiences and training from non-western women activists.
The current situation in Iraq leaves doubt about the intentions of the US in terms of good governance, its commitment to human rights and democracy-building.
Especially where women and gender relations are concerned, I personally do not expect too much from the occupying forces, considering Bush's record of conservative policies towards women in the US. The case of Afghanistan is a sad example of the US government paying lip service to women's rights, but not actually seeing it through in the aftermath of the war. In fact, Afghanistan is an example of how not to do it as the mere appointment of a women's minister without resources (who subsequently had to resign) was a cynical token towards a human and women's rights agenda. 
